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Appellate Review in a Sentencing Guidelines
Jurisdiction: The Pennsylvania Experience*
Joseph A. Del Sole**
INTRODUCTION
Society has long sought to determine appropriate compensation
for anti-social behavior. From the time of Moses,' through the
Middle Ages,2 to the present, human-kind has sought ways to
punish crime.
Pennsylvania, at the time of its founding in 1682, had the most
lenient criminal code, with murder being the only crime punishable
by death. Property crimes were punishable by restitution, and
crimes against the person resulted in whippings or imprisonment
for a second offense.4 Initially, prisons were designed to provide
work which it was believed would lead to rehabilitation. The
* This article is adapted from a thesis submitted by the author in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Law in the Judicial Process at the
University of Virginia.
** B.S.M.E. Carnegie Institute of Technology (Now Carnegie Mellon University);
L.L.B. Duquesne University School of Law; L.L.M. University of Virginia. Judge, Superior
Court of Pennsylvania.
I am grateful to several people for their help in preparing this article: to my thesis advi-
sor, Richard J. Bonnie, John S. Battle, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of
Law, for his patience, understanding, critique and suggestions; to my law clerks, Caryn T.
Chernicky, Esquire and Catherine Lyles, Esquire for their research and editing assistance;
to my secretaries, Joyce Hanzel and Dolores Bianco for creating the finished product and
answering my word processing questions.
1. The Holy Bible, Book of Exodus, ch 21-22 (New International Version 1984).
2. Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation Of The Western Legal
Tradition at 52-54 (Harvard University Press 1983) details the development of 7th century
codes in Western Europe as a means for providing economic compensation to victims of
crime to be paid by the accused. Their purpose was to eliminate retaliation and maintain
order. Berman, Law and Revolution at 55.
3. Recently Congress considered the Crime Control Act of 1991, HR 3371. It was
passed by the House but not the Senate. It would have created 51 additional Federal death
penalty crimes.
4. Kathleen Preyer, Penal Measures In The American Colonies: An Overview, 26
Am J of Legal Hist 333, 336 (1982). "The Quakers arrived in America with new conceptions
of society and penal sanctions. William Penn's initial criminal code for Pennsylvania was
grounded in Quaker religious belief which minimized the traditional Christian doctrine of
original sin, saw causes of crime in poverty, and believed that under proper treatment the
worst criminals could be reformed." Preyer, Penal Measures , 26 Am J of Legal Hist at 336.
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Quakers distrusted courts and attempted to have disputes resolved
among the parties." By 1700, however, the political and social cli-
mate had changed and more severe penalties were introduced. Ul-
timately, by 1718, Pennsylvania's laws included many of the capi-
tal crimes of England.'
Another turnabout occurred later in the century and by 1786
certain capital crimes had been eliminated." In 1794 the death pen-
alty was abolished in Pennsylvania for all crimes but murder.8
In addition to restricting use of the death penalty to murder, the
1794 Act further classified murder as first or second degree.9 First
degree murder was either premeditated or felony murder, and was
punishable by either death or life in prison. All other murder was
second degree, and punishable by imprisonment for up to 20 years
for a first offense and life for a second. 10 The Act's preamble was
interesting. It defined the purpose of punishment as a means to
prevent crime and repair the damage to society. It stated that
these goals were best served by "moderate but certain penalties"
and asserted that a function of government was to reform
offenders."
5. Id at 337 (cited in note 4). "Within the Quaker meeting such communal proce-
dures [reconciliations] were exercised in minor criminal matters as well as civil disputes
[footnote omitted] ...us[e] of the peace bond, before a person had been criminally ac-
cused, was an effort to render criminal court action unnecessary." Id.
6. In her article Professor Preyer seemed to attribute this move toward stricter pun-
ishment to social conditions within the colony. Id at 337, 343 (cited in note 4). However, a
different analysis of the reasons for this change was offered by Professor Edwin R. Keedy,
History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 Pa L Rev 759 (1949).
He attributed the changes to political forces of the time. In 1692 King William and Queen
Mary removed Penn as governor and appointed Benjamin Fletcher, then Governor of New
York, to be Governor of Pennsylvania. By 1718, because of the refusal of the Queen to
approve acts of the Provincial Assembly, "Quakers were not permitted to qualify for judicial
office or to testify in criminal cases by making affirmation instead of taking an oath. [foot-
note omitted]. . .In order to secure the privilege of affirmation the Assembly. . .passed an
act in 1718 which after providing that judicial officers and witnesses might qualify by affir-
mation, repealed the 'humane' laws instituted by William Penn, and proscribed the death
penalty for [sixteen additional crimes]." Professor Keedy stated that Pennsylvania contin-
ued to expand the number of crimes for which the death penalty would apply. Keedy, His-
tory of PA Statute, 97 Pa L Rev at 762-64.
7. Id at 767. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, History of American Law at 281 (Si-
mon and Schuster, 2d ed 1985).
8. Keedy, History of PA Statute, 97 Pa L Rev at 772 (cited in note 6).
9. Id at 772 citing 4 Journal Of The Senate 80 (1794).
10. Id at 772 (cited in note 6).
11. Id citing 4 Journal Of The Senate 80 (1794). "Whereas the design of punishment
is to prevent the commission of crimes, and to repair the injury that hath been done thereby
to society or the individual, and it hath been found by experience, that these objects are
better obtained by moderate but certain penalties, than by severe and excessive punish-
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The same year which brought changes in the law also brought
the remodeling of the Walnut Street prison in Philadelphia. Pris-
oners were either to work or to be kept in solitary confinement
where they could meditate and reform their lives. It was ultimately
conceded that isolation was cruel punishment and was discarded.1 2
As focus on the rehabilitative possibilities of the defendant be-
gan to emerge, indeterminate and suspended sentencing practices
developed." By the turn of the century, Pennsylvania was well im-
mersed in this process. By the 1970's there was a growing national
concern over sentencing disparity and Pennsylvania was not im-
mune from those forces.
The General Assembly passed a comprehensive sentencing code
in 1974 which detailed a decisional process that trial judges were
required to exercise in determining sentences.1" The code defined
the type of sentences available,' 5 the conditions under which pro-
bation was appropriate, 16 and the circumstances under which con-
finement was to be invoked. 7
At the same time, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania began the
process of appellate review of sentencing decisions. This was a ma-
jor departure from past practice and illustrative of a more aggres-
sive appellate role. The state high court's actions were tentative,
and limited to a procedural examination of the sentencing process.
In 1978 the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing ("Commis-
sion") was created and charged with the responsibility of establish-
ing sentencing guidelines.' 8 This system, which has remained sub-
stantially in place, clearly functioned to eliminate sentencing
disparity and promoted a greater consistency in sentencing deci-
sions. The enactment of the guidelines and recent supreme court
decisions that have limited appellate review have, however, raised
the question whether guideline compliance has been at the expense
ments: And whereas it is the duty of every government to endeavor to reform, rather than
exterminate offenders, and the punishment of death ought never to be inflicted, where it is
not absolutely necessary to the public safety." Id (cited in note 6).
12. Freidman, History of American Law at 296 (cited in note 7). See also Arthur W.
Campbell, Law of Sentencing §1.2 at 7 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 2d ed 1991) referred to
this as the first penitentiary in America.
13. Freudnabm History of American Law at 597 (cited in note 7).
14. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9701, et seq (Purdon 1981).
15. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9721 (Purdon 1981) provides for the range of sentencing
alternatives from guilt without further penalty to total confinement.
16. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9722 (Purdon 1981).
17. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9725 (Purdon 1981).
18. Act 319 of Nov 26, 1978, Pub L No 1316, codified at 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§
2151-2155 and §§ 9721-9781 (Purdon 1981).
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of individualized sentencing.
The same legislation which created the Commission also in-
cluded a provision codifying appellate review.19 By the terms of
this provision, the legislature intended appellate review to be part
of the sentencing process. This review insures that the trial courts
have considered and applied the guidelines and insures that depar-
tures from the guidelines will be permitted where necessary. De-
spite this clear legislative intent, the supreme court has recently
acted to limit appellate review of the discretionary aspects of
sentencing.
It is the purpose of this article to suggest that appellate review is
a necessary component of an effective guideline system and that
parties should have an opportunity to seek such review. Further,
this article will show that recent supreme and superior court deci-
19. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9781 (Purdon 1981).
Appellate review of sentence
(a) right to appeal-The defendant or the Commonwealth may appeal as of right the
legality of the sentence.
(b) allowance of appeal-The defendant or the Commonwealth may file a petition for
allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misde-
meanor to the appellate court that has initial jurisdiction for such appeals. Allowance
of appeal may be granted at the discretion of the appellate court where it appears
that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate
under this chapter.
(c) determination on appeal-The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and re-
mand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the guidelines but ap-
plied the guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the
case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be
clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the
sentence is unreasonable.
In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence imposed by the sen-
tencing court.
(d) review of record-In reviewing the record the appellate court shall have regard
for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character-
istics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, includ-
ing any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
(e) right to bail not enlarged-Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to enlarge
the defendant's right to bail pending appeal.
(f) limitation on additional appellate review--No appeal of the discretionary aspects
of the sentence shall be permitted beyond the appellate court that has original juris-
diction for such appeals.
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9781.
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sions limiting review are inconsistent with legislative intent and
the development of a coherent guideline system.
20
APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCING BEFORE THE GUIDELINES
Pennsylvania's appellate courts have a long history of limited re-
view of sentencing matters.21 Until the 1974 sentencing code was
enacted, they held that sentencing was within the discretion of the
trial courts and review was only possible if the sentence exceeded
the statutorily prescribed punishment (legal limit) or was mani-
festly excessive.2 2 In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated
in 1973 that it was not aware of any non-capital case where it had
reduced an appellant's sentence.23
Pennsylvania's appellate courts have always retained the ability
to correct an illegal sentence. Multiple sentences for the same of-
fense have been voided2 4 and sentences that exceeded the statutory
maximum have been corrected. 25 These actions were based on the
premise that an illegal sentence was beyond the power of the sen-
tencing court and could be reviewed at any time. In fact, illegality
20. The National Center for State Courts, in its final report, Understanding Revers-
ible Error in Criminal Appeals, which was submitted to the State Justice Institute, identi-
fied sentencing error as an emerging issue facing state appellate courts. It' reported that in
Rhode Island, an indeterminate sentencing state, there was a sentencing error rate of 38.5
percent. Other courts studied had error rates ranging from 15 to 30 percent. The National
Center for State Courts, Understanding Reversible Error in Criminal Appeals 1, 19 (Na-
tional Center for State Courts 1989).
21. Since 1911 Pennsylvania has embraced the concept of indeterminate sentencing.
Act of June 19, 1911, § 6. A sentencing court is required to set a minimum and maximum
period of incarceration with the minimum not to exceed one-half the maximum. The pris-
oner's release date is determined by the Parole Board but cannot occur before the minimum
sentence is served.
22. Commonwealth v Wrona, 442 Pa 201, 275 A2d 78 (1971). While this case dealt
with an appeal by the Commonwealth and ultimately held that the Commonwealth's right
to appeal in criminal matters was limited to "a pure question of law" the Court also stated
"that the sentence imposed on a person convicted of a crime lies ... within the sole discre-
tion of the trial court, and the sentence imposed will not be reviewed by an appellate court,
unless it exceeds the statutory prescribed limits or is so manifestly excessive as to constitute
too severe a punishment." Wrona, 275 A2d at 80-81. See also Commonwealth v Bilinski, 190
Pa Super 401, 154 A2d 322 (1959). I suggest that limiting review to a manifestly excessive
sentence is incorrect. Rather, review should be permitted and reversal be limited.
23. Commonwealth v Lee, 450 Pa 152, 156-57 n 4, 299 A2d 640, 642-43 n 4 (1973)
"We are unaware of any cases where this Court has reduced an appellant's sentence except
in those. . . capital cases where the death penalty was imposed." Lee, 299 A2d at 642-43 n
4. See also Commonwealth v Person, 450 Pa 1, 247 A2d 460 (1973).
24. Commonwealth ex rel Shaddock v Ashe, 340 Pa 286, 17 A2d 190 (1941); Com-
monwealth v Zaengle, 332 Pa Super 137, 480 A2d 1224 (1984).
25. Commonwealth v Britton, 334 Pa Super 203, 482 A2d 1294 (1984); Common-
wealth v Albertson, 269 Pa Super 505, 410 A2d 815 (1979).
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can be raised sua sponte by the appellate court.2 6 However, for
many years it was evident that appellate review of the discretion-
ary aspects of sentencing was nonexistent in Pennsylvania.
The door to appellate review was opened by the supreme court
in Commonwealth v Martin.27 The crimes involved in this series of
six separate appeals occurred before the 1974 sentencing code was
enacted. The appellants were each charged with illegal sales of her-
oin and each received a sentence of three to ten years' imprison-
ment per sale which were to run consecutively. On appeal it was
established that the local judges had previously agreed on a uni-
form policy involving convictions for the sale of heroin which gave
no consideration to the individual characteristics of any defendant.
The court concluded that the sentences imposed were in conform-
ity with that predetermined policy and that the individual circum-
stances of each case were not considered at sentencing. No pre-
sentence report was ordered, nor had any effort been made to de-
termine the rehabilitative needs of the individual defendants.
The majority held that the trial court's actions were an abuse of
discretion and stated:
The procedures employed by the sentencing court in the appeals before us
today ignore the basic premises of Pennsylvania's individualized sentencing.
Here . . . the nature of the criminal act was used as the sole basis for the
determination of the length of sentence, and all sentences of imprisonment
were to run consecutively. Thus the court failed to exercise its broad discre-
tion in accordance with the applicable statutory requirements.
The sentence must be imposed for the minimum amount of confinement
that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the of-
fense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . . At least two fac-
tors are crucial to such determination-the particular circumstances of the
offense and the character of the defendant.. . . We hold. . . the sentencing
court must at least consider these two factors in its sentencing determina-
tion. Failure to give such individualized consideration requires that these
sentences be vacated.
2 8
While this decision opened the door to appellate review of trial
court action in sentencing, it was a procedurally based rather than
a substantively based opening.29 That is, the trial court's proce-
26. Commonwealth v Boerner, 281 Pa Super 505, 422 A2d 583 (1980).
27. 466 Pa 118, 351 A2d 650 (1976).
28. Martin, 351 A2d at 657-58 (citations and footnotes omitted).
29.. The Court also directed, that its Criminal Rules Committee prepare a recommen-
dation to require a sentencing court to state on the record why it failed to order a
presentence report "1) where incarceration for one year or more is a possible disposition: 2)
where the defendant is less than twenty-one years old; and 3) where the defendant is a first
offender." Id at 659. See also PaRCrP 1403, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1981).
Vol. 31:479
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dures in arriving at the sentence would be scrutinized by the re-
viewing court, but the appropriateness of the sentence itself, for a
particular defendant would not be reviewed if all of the procedures
had been followed. The dissent opined that the decision would al-
low appellate courts to impose their sentencing philosophies on
sentencing courts which deviated from prior practice.30
In Commonwealth v Riggins,3' decided the following year, the
supreme court further broadened the scope of appellate review
based on procedural grounds. A twenty-one year old, married, fa-
ther of three, recently unemployed with no prior record, had been
convicted of possession with intent to deliver 1.9 ounces of mari-
juana and sentenced to two to five years imprisonment. The Court
reaffirmed its commitment, first enunciated in Martin, and re-
quired a pre-sentence report. Furthermore, it required trial courts
to state the reasons for the sentence on the record.3 2 After discuss-
ing its rationale for this requirement, the court stated:
Critics of the requirement that a trial court articulate the reasons for its
sentence assert that sentencing is not amenable to structured decision mak-
ing and that requiring a statement of reasons will be an unwarranted bur-
den upon the trial court. We are convinced that these arguments are with-
out merit...
... we are persuaded that the sentencing process will be improved by re-
quiring a trial court to state, on the record, the reasons for the sentence
imposed.3
8
The court also required that a person seeking to challenge the trial
court's reasoning for its sentence must first raise the issue with
that court. It directed its Rules Committee to prepare a rule to
accomplish this goal. "
30. Martin, 351 A2d at 660. The author of the dissenting opinion, Justice Nix, now
Chief Justice, stated in a later dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v Goldhammer, 512 Pa
587, 597, 517 A2d 1280, 1285 (1986) "Under settled Pennsylvania law, the sentence imposed
lies within the sole discretion of the sentencing court and will not be reviewed by an appel-
late court unless it exceeds statutory prescribed limits or is so manifestly excessive as to
constitute too severe a punishment for the offense committed." Goldhammer, 517 A2d at
1285. No mention was made of the individual characteristics of the defendant.
31. 474 Pa 115, 377 A2d 140 (1977). The offense and conviction both pre-dated the
1974 sentencing code.
32. Riggins, 377 A2d at 143.
33. Id at 148-49.
34. Id. This call was answered by PaRCrP 1410, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1981)
which states "[a] motion to modify sentence shall be in writing and shall be filed with the
sentencing court within ten (10) days after imposition of sentence."
Two points should be made. First, Pennsylvania has an extensive post-trial practice phi-
losophy premised on the view that trial courts should be given the first opportunity to cor-
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Although the 1974 sentencing code was not in effect when the
crimes were committed in both Martin and Riggins, the supreme
court referred to it as illustrative of the individualized nature of
Pennsylvania sentencing practices and as policy support for its ac-
tion in reviewing those sentences.3 5 Within that framework, the ap-
pellate courts became more active in examining the sentencing ac-
tions of trial judges. In Commonwealth v Cottle,36 the supreme
court applied a section of the 1974 code dealing with probation
revocation 37 to vacate the imposition of total confinement for a
probation violation. It determined that the sentencing court did
not give sufficient consideration to the fact that the defendant had
succeeded in effectively rehabilitating himself even though he had
not reported to the probation department between 1972-1976. In
its decision the court stated:
Traditionally, appellate courts in this jurisdiction have been reluctant to
intrude upon the sentencing discretion of trial courts. We have long main-
tained that the appellate scope of review of the sentencing decision should
be limited to sentences that exceed the statutorily prescribed limits or
sentences which were so manifestly excessive as to constitute a constitution-
ally impermissible sentence [citations omitted]. This perception evolved
from our adherence to the concept of individualized sentencing and the be-
lief that the effectuation of that objective was best served by granting broad
discretion to the sentencing courts. [citation omitted] More recently, [the]
question has been raised as to the wisdom of conferring upon the sentencing
court almost unlimited, unstructured and unreviewable discretion. Both the
legislature and this Court have been gravitating to a curtailment of the un-
limited discretion originally entrusted to the sentencing court [footnotes
omitted].38
The superior court in Commonwealth v Franklin,39 a post-sen-
tencing code but pre-guideline case, discussed at length the factors
that a sentencing judge must consider when sentencing. The court
and counsel must have access to a pre-sentence report or state on
the record why none was available.' 0 The defendant has the right
rect errors. See PaRCrP 1123, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1981) and PaRCP 227.1, 42 Pa
Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1981).
Second, the filing of the 1410 motion does not stop the running of the thirty day time for
taking an appeal following imposition of sentence unless the trial court grants reconsidera-
tion within those same thirty days. See Comment to PaRCrP 1410, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann.
35. Riggins, 377 A2d at 149-50; and Martin, 351 A2d at 656 n 20.
36. 493 Pa 377, 426 A2d 598 (1981).
37. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9771 (Purdon 1981).
38. Cottle, 426 A2d at 600. The opinion was authored by Jutice Nix who also au-
thored the Goldhammer dissent cited in note 30.
39. 301 Pa Super 17, 446 A2d 1313 (1982).
40. Franklin, 446 A2d at 1318. See also PaRCrP 1403, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon
1993 Review in Sentencing Guidelines Jurisdiction 487
to present information and conduct argument."1 The court must
consider the circumstances of the crime and the character and
background of the defendant."' There can be no predetermined
sentencing policy or a sentence that exceeds that which was statu-
torily prescribed.'3 The court must state why it rejected probation
or partial confinement." The court can only impose total confine-
ment if the provisions of section 9725 45are met and the court must
set forth it reasons for the sentence imposed.'6
Between 1976 and 1982, Pennsylvania appellate courts began re-
viewing sentences imposed by trial judges. This review recognized
the concept of individualized sentencing. However, it was a proce-
durally based review. A "common law" of sentencing dealing with
substantive questions did not develop.'7 The appellate courts, even
when finding fault with the sentence, would not impose sentence
but would remand to the trial court for resentencing using the cor-
rect procedure which required consideration of a number of fac-
tors. Since reversals were procedurally based, the trial courts were
free to reimpose the original sentence as long as the identified er-
1981).
41. Franklin, 446 A2d at 1318.
42. Id. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9731 details the need for pre-sentence reports in sen-
tencing matters.
43. Franklin, 446 A2d at 1318.
44. Id. This requirement was established in Commonwealth v Kostka, 475 Pa 85, 379
A2d 884 (1977).
45. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9725 provides:
Total confinement:
The court shall impose a sentence of total confinement if, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the de-
fendant, it is of the opinion that the total confinement of the defendant is necessary
because:
(1) there is undue risk that during a period of probation or partial confinement
the defendant will commit another crime;
(2) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(3) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the crime of the
defendant.
42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9725
46. Franklin, 446 A2d at 1318. PaRCrP 1405, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1981)
requires that the court state the reasons for the sentence. That section of the rule was
adopted in 1973, prior to the sentencing code.
47. For an interesting discussion of the procedural nature of Pennsylvania appellate
review of sentencing, see the unpublished paper prepared by John P. McCloskey, The Effec-
tiveness of Independent Sentencing Commission Guidelines: An Analysis of Appellate
Court Decisions in Two Jurisdictions, delivered at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the Ameri-
can Society of Criminology, San Diego, California. Mr. McCloskey was a research associate
for the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
Duquesne Law Review
rant procedure had been corrected.
Commonwealth v Jones" typified this process. In 1985, the de-
fendant pleaded guilty to numerous offenses involving sexual abuse
of children. He received consecutive sentences totalling fifty to one
hundred years. On appeal, a panel of the superior court in an un-
published memorandum "9 found the length of the sentence to be
manifestly excessive. 0 It further determined that "the lower court
did not take adequate consideration of the appellant's background,
his crime-free adult record, the relatively short time span during
which the crimes occurred, his undisputed mental illness and ex-
pression of remorse, and the prospects of treatment of appellant's
illness. 651 Pointing out that a sentence half as severe would keep
the defendant in prison until age sixty-three, the court remanded
"to the lower court for correction of its manifestly excessive
sentence."52
The Commonwealth's request for review was granted by the su-
preme court which concluded that it was statutorily precluded
from reviewing actions of the intermediate appellate court involv-
ing discretionary sentencing questions." However, the supreme
court stated that it did not view the panel decision of the interme-
diate court as precluding the trial judge from imposing the same




Following remand, the trial court imposed the same sentence. 6
On appeal, the superior court affirmed and concluded that once the
trial court considered all of the necessary factors in sentencing,
and the weight to be given those factors, the final sentence im-
posed was within the sentencing judge's discretion and would not
48. Pa Super , 613 A2d 587 (1991).
49. Commonwealth v Jones, No 01433PHL86 (Pa Super May 18, 1987). In 1979 the
superior court adopted a policy of not publishing certain panel decisions labeled memoran-
dum. The decision whether to publish is left to the panel, guided by the court's internal
operating rules which call for publication only if new areas of the law are involved or if the
issue is believed to be of sufficient importance to the bench and bar to warrant publication.
Generally, only 18 percent of the court's panel decisions are published. Superior Court of
Pennsylvania Annual Report 1990.
50. Jones, slip op at 2.
51. Id at 3.
52. Id at 4.
53. Commonwealth v Jones, 523 Pa 138, 565 A2d 732 (1989). § 9781(f) of the sen-
tencing code limits sentencing review to the intermediate appellate court. See note 19 and
accompanying text.
54. Jones, 565 A2d at 735.
55. Commonwealth v Jones, Pa Super ,613 A2d 587 (1991).
Vol. 31:479
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be disturbed on appeal."8 Having found that on remand the trial
judge considered the defendant's mental illness, the majority re-
jected the prior panel's and dissent's concern that the sentence was
effectively a life sentence requiring incarceration of this thirty-
eight year old until age eighty-eight.5" This case clearly demon-
strated that the reviewing court's failure to impose a reduced sen-
tence made review on procedural grounds meaningless.58
In Commonwealth v Parrish,59 the court vacated a sentence and
stated what, in its judgment, would be an appropriate sentence.
However, it concluded by remanding to the trial court for resen-
tencing, "rely[ing] on the good judgment of the trial court to
amend a manifestly excessive sentence." 60
THE GUIDELINE SYSTEM
The legislation creating the Pennsylvania Commission on Sen-
tencing charged the Commission with the responsibility of devel-
oping guidelines to be used by judges when sentencing. The guide-
lines were to:
(1) Specify the range of sentences applicable to crimes of a given degree of
gravity.
(2) Specify a range of sentences of increased severity for defendants previ-
ously convicted of a felony or felonies or convicted of a crime involving the
use of a deadly weapon.
(3) Prescribe variations from the range of sentences applicable on account
of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.0 '
Within this framework, the Commission began its work and on
January 24, 1981, submitted its recommendations to the General
56. Jones, 613 A2d at 591.
57. Id. Pennsylvania does not presently employ any type of "good time" sentencing
reduction. Before being eligible for release, a prisoner must serve at least'the minimum.
58. This type of resentencing problem can also arise where the sentence is too leni-
ent. In Commonwealth v Brown, 402 Pa Super 369, 587 A2d 6 (1991), the defendant was
originally sentenced to an aggregate 20 to 40 month term for aggravated assault. On appeal,
the superior court vacated and remanded for resentencing and commented that the sentence
appeared unreasonably lenient. Following remand, the trial court reimposed the same sen-
tence. On appeal, the superior court again reversed the trial court and remanded for resen-
tencing, concluding that the trial court erred in finding that the conviction for possession of
an instrument of crime merged into the aggravated assault conviction. Commonwealth v
Brown, No 1767PHL91 (Pa Super May 22, 1992).
59. 340 Pa Super 528, 490 A2d 905 (1985), appeal quashed 515 Pa 297, 528 A2d 151
(1987).
60. Parrish, 490 A2d at 910. There was no appeal to the superior court following
remand.
61. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2154 (Purdon 1981).
1993
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Assembly. They were rejected on March 31, 1981. 62 The rejection
resolution directed the Commission to increase the upper limits of
sentences in its various sections, give judges greater latitude in
considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, clarify those
circumstances, change its proposal on concurrent and consecutive
sentences and increase penalties where actual or threatened serious
bodily harm is involved. The Commission submitted revised guide-
lines to the General Assembly on January 23, 1982. They were ap-
proved and became effective July 22, 1982.63
Also, the sentencing code was amended to add the following:
(b) . . . The court shall also consider any guidelines for sentencing adopted
by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing . . . . In every case in
which the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, the court
shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of
sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.
In every case where the court imposes a sentence outside the sentencing
guidelines. . . the court shall provide a contemporaneous written statement
of the reason or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines." Failure to
comply shall be grounds for vacating the sentence and resentencing the de-
fendant . . ..
This language made consideration of the guidelines mandatory,
but not their application."
The guidelines were the culmination of extensive efforts by the
commission. They were designed to permit sentencing discretion
yet eliminate sentence disparity. This was to be accomplished by
focusing consideration on the nature of the offense and the defend-
ant's prior criminal activity.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on October 7, 1987, decided
Commonwealth v Sessomse ' and invalided the guidelines. In re-
62. House Resolution No 24, Session of 1981, (March 31, 1981).
63. These can be found in the 12 Pa Bull No 4 (Saturday, January 23, 1982).
64. This requirement of a "contemporaneous written statement" is satisfied by stat-
ing on the record at the time of sentencing the reasons for the departure. Commonwealth v
Royer, 328 Pa Super 60, 476 A2d 453 (1984); and Commonwealth v Catanch, 398 Pa Super
466, 581 A2d 226 (1990). However, failure to state sufficient reasons on the record at the
time of sentencing cannot be corrected by submitting a Commission Sentencing Form. Com-
monwealth v Vinson, 361 Pa Super 526, 522 A2d 1155 (1987). It should be noted that at
least one superior court panel has reviewed such a form to determine whether there were
sufficient reasons for the sentence. Commonwealth v Terrizzi, 348 Pa Super 607, 502 A2d
711 (1985).
65. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9721(b) (Purdon 1981).
66. Commonwealth v Sheridan, 348 Pa Super 574, 502 A2d 694 (1985); and Common-
wealth v Fraizer, 347 Pa Super 64, 500 A2d 158 (1985).
67. 516 Pa 365, 532 A2d 775 (1987). The court determined that the joint resolution of
the General Assembly rejecting the original Commission recommendation of January 24,
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sponse to this decision, the Legislature and Commission acted
quickly6" and new guidelines were adopted effective April 25,
1988.69 The present guidelines:
(A) assign offense gravity scores to applicable crimes.
70
(B) assign a prior record score to the defendant.
71
(C) deal only with minimum term of confinement
(D) establish a sentence range chart that suggests standard, mitigated and
aggravated ranges of punishment;
7
(E) list factors to be considered as aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances'7 and
(F) require the addition of 12 to 24 months to the guideline range if a
deadly weapon is used .
7
In applying these guidelines, the sentencing judge is given a wide
range of options. For example, a defendant with. an offense gravity
score of 1, and a prior record score of 6, would be eligible for a
mitigated range sentence of non-confinement, a standard range
sentence between 0-6 months, and an aggravated range sentence of
the statutory limit. A defendant with a prior record score of 6 and
an offense gravity score of 10, would be eligible for a mitigated
range sentence between 76-102 months, a standard range sentence
between 102-120 months, and an aggravated sentence of the statu-
tory limit75 In addition, the court is permitted to depart above or
below guideline ranges; it only is required to state its reasons for
departure.
In 1990, 86 percent of all sentences conformed to the guidelines.
Of that number, 74.6 percent were in the standard range, 9.2 per-
cent in the mitigated range, 2.2 percent in the aggravated range. Of
the remaining 14 percent, 12.6 percent departed below and 1.4 per-
1981 was invalid since it had not been presented to the Governor for approval. Conse-
quently, the subsequently adopted guidelines were also invalid. Sessoms, 532 A2d at 778-79.
68. During this hiatus, the legislature passed mandatory sentencing for certain drug
crimes. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 7508 (Purdon 1981). While the guidelines have been in effect,
the legislature has not passed any mandatory sentencing legislation.
69. Section 2 of Act March 22, 1988, Pub Law 240 No 26. See historical note, 42 Pa
Cons Stat Ann § 2151 (Purdon 1981). They apply to crimes committed after April 25, 1988.
70. 204 Pa Code § 303.8. These scores range from 1 for misdemeanors III to 10 for
third degree murder. In addition, a separate list exists for drug offenses. This list includes
scores from A to M, depending on factors such as type and quantity of the drug involved.
71. 204 Pa Code § 303.7. This section lists the types of prior convictions and the
points attributable to each. The maximum score that can be given is 6.
72. 204 Pa Code § 303.9 (b) for non-drug related crimes and § 303.9 (c)(3) for drug
crimes.
73. 204 Pa Code § 303.3.
74. 204 Pa Code § 303.4(a).
75. 204 Pa Code § 303.9 (b). This chart does not include drug related offenses.
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cent were above the guideline ranges.76 Multiple current convic-
tions and plea-agreements were the two reasons most cited for de-
parting above." Multiple sentences and plea agreements were the
two reasons most cited for departing below the guideline ranges.78
Also, departure rates varied based on the nature of the crime.
7 9 Of
the 14 percent departure rate, about 6 percent were dispositional
(i.e. no incarceration imposed where guidelines recommend incar-
ceration), and 8 percent were durational.
There has been an overall conformity rate to the guidelines that
has generally ranged between 85 and 90 percent from 1984 to
1990.80 However, that rate declined from late 1987 until the first
quarter of 1989. This is directly attributed to the decision in Ses-
soms which invalidated the guidelines.81 During the period be-
tween invalidation and repassage, the average minimum sentence
in Pennsylvania increased.8
The conformity rate demonstrates the effect of the guidelines on
sentencing decisions. It further suggests overcompliance with the
guidelines in sentencing decisions. During the period in which the
guidelines were suspended, the conformity rate declined, evidenc-
ing a more particularized sentencing approach by trial judges. Ap-
pellate review of sentencing decisions would limit overcompliance
with the guidelines and allow for individualized sentencing.8 "
76. 1990-1991 Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, figure
F at 20 (on file at Duquesne Law Review).
77. Id, Table 10 at 29 (cited in note 76).
78. Id, Table 11 at 30 (cited in note 76).
79. Id, Table 9 at 28 (cited in note 76).
80. Id at 44 (cited in note 76). Michael Tonry in his article, The Politics and
Processes of Sentencing Commissions, 37 No 3 Crime and Delinquency, 307, 314 (July 1991)
posits "[wihether [Pennsylvania's guidelines] have significantly reduced sentencing dispari-
ties within individual courts, between counties, or between regions, remains unclear.. . it is
difficult to know to what extent sentencing in Pennsylvania is different today from what it
would have been had the guidelines not been established." Tonry, Politics, 37 No 3 Crime
and Delinquency at 314. However, in any individualized sentencing scheme, where one of
the objectives is to rehabilitate the offender to allow for return to the community, there will
appear to be disparity. It is suggested that this appearance disappears when individual fac-
tors are considered.
81. 1990-1991 Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing at 43
(cited in note 76). (See note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sessoms.)
82. Id, Figure 0 at 45 (cited in note 76).
83. Roger A. Hanson and Joy Chapper, What Does Sentencing Reform Do To Crimi-
nal Appeals?, 72 No 1 Judicature 50 (June-July 1988) compared the appeal rate of sentenc-
ing among three jurisdictions: Sacramento, California and Springfield, Illinois, determinate
sentencing jurisdictions and Rhode Island, a indeterminate sentencing jurisdiction. The
number of sentencing appeals were 42 percent in California, 53 percent in Illinois, and 9
percent in Rhode Island. Hanson and Chapper, Sentencing Reform, 72 No 1 Judicature at
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APPELLATE REVIEW OF GUIDELINES CASES
Included in the legislation establishing the Sentencing Commis-
sion was the section on appellate review.84 It provides both parties
a right of appeal on questions of sentence legality. It permits either
party to seek review of the discretionary aspects of sentencing but
limits that review to the discretion of the appellate court. The sec-
tion further sets forth the standard by which the appellate court
shall vacate a sentence and the nature of the review, giving due
deference to the ability of the trial court to observe the defendant
and the defendant's past criminal behavior.
8 5
Initially, implementation of the guidelines led to the develop-
ment of appellate case law defining its terms 8 and application.8 7
At the same time, the superior court began to examine the deci-
sional process of sentencing judges in line with Martin and Rig-
gins.8' When faced with a challenge to the discretionary actions of
a trial judge in imposing a sentence, the court would review the
decisional process of the judge as reflected in the sentencing hear-
ing transcript s 9 Any reliance upon what the appellate court con-
50.
84. See note 19 for text of statute.
85. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9781 (Purdon 1981). See note 19 and accompanying text.
86. Illustrative are cases dealing with 204 Pa Code § 303.4, Deadly weapon enhance-
ment. The superior court was called upon to define the term "possession,"in Commonwealth
v Taylor, 346 Pa Super 599, 500 A2d 110 (1985); and "weapon" in Commonwealth v Burns,
390 Pa Super 426, 568 A2d 974 (1990); Commonwealth v Batterson, 409 Pa Super 335, 601
A2d 335 (1992) (motor vehicle not a weapon); and Commonwealth v Scullin, 411 Pa Super
252, 601 A2d 335 (1992) (tire iron considered weapon). The standard of proof required for
application was considered in Commonwealth v McKeithan, 350 Pa Super 160, 504 A2d 294
(1986). The relationship between guideline sentence enhancement and mandatory firearms
sentencing requirements was examined in Commonwealth v Grimmitt, 354 Pa Super 463,
512 A2d 43 (1986). Application following a guilty plea where the plea contained no reference
to the use of a weapon was at issued in Taylor, 500 A2d at 110 ; and mandatory application
in Commonwealth v Johnakin, 348 Pa Super 432, 502 A2d 620 (1985) was the subject of
review.
87. Johnakin, 502 A2d at 620 (effect of merger on offense gravity score); Common-
wealth v Maleno, 348 Pa Super 426, 502 A2d 617 (1985) (value to be assigned convictions
under prior statutes); Commonwealth v Dickison, 334 Pa Super 549, 483 A2d 874 (1984)
(application of correct gravity score to facts of crime); Commonwealth v Woodard, 368 Pa
Super 363, 534 A2d 478 (1987) (effect of juvenile adjudication on prior record score); Com-
monwealth v Bolden, 367 Pa Super 333, 532 A2d 1172 (1987) (determination of prior record
score based on convictions in foreign jurisdictions); Commonwealth v Kozarian, 388 Pa
Super 627, 566 A2d 304 (1989) (application of prior record score to criminal transaction as a
whole where three separately charged crimes are committed at the same time).
88. For discussion, see notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
89. The following cases deal with the sufficiency of the reasons given for the sentence
as stated by the judge. Commonwealth v Hainsey, 379 Pa Super 376, 550 A2d 207 (1988);
Commonwealth v Chilquist, 378 Pa Super 55, 548 A2d 272 (1988); Commonwealth v
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sidered an impermissible factor in sentencing could result in the
vacation of the sentence and remand for resentencing.90 It is im-
possible to determine if the appellate court, when faced with a sen-
tence it viewed as either too lenient or too severe, searched for an
error in the sentencing process to permit remand.91
For example, in Commonwealth v Hutchinson,92 the defendant
received a five year probationary sentence following a conviction of
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a three year old child.
This sentence departed from the guidelines and the Common-
wealth appealed. In vacating and remanding for resentencing, the
superior court held;
The guidelines channel sentencing discretion and focus appellate review
which is available to both parties, on the reasonableness of deviations from
the presumptively appropriate range of sentences. In sum, only in excep-
tional cases and for sufficient reasons may a court deviate from the
guidelines.9 3
Trial courts apparently got the message. Following this July 5,
1985 decision, there was an increase in the conformity rate of
sentences to the guidelines. Compliance rose to and exceeded 90
percent until the October, 1987 decision by the state supreme
court in Sessoms.94
Beginning with Commonwealth v Tuladziecki,95 the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court, changed the procedural method by which the
superior court could review appeals from the discretionary aspects
of sentencing. Mr. Tuladziecki was sentenced to pay a fine and to
serve five years' probation for his conviction on drug related of-
fenses. This sentence was below the guidelines and the Common-
wealth appealed. The superior court concluded that the appellant
had complied with the requirement of section 9781(b) of the sen-
Fetzner, 372 Pa Super 469, 539 A2d 890 (1988); Commonwealth v Thomas, 370 Pa Super
544, 537 A2d 9 (1988); Commonwealth v Cherpes, 360 Pa Super 246, 520 A2d 439 (1987);
Commonwealth v Stafford, 313 Pa Super 231, 459 A2d 824 (1983). In addition, the court
reviewed to determine if the trial judge focused solely on the nature of the criminal act.
Commonwealth v Plasterer, 365 Pa Super 190, 529 A2d 37 (1987).
90. Commonwealth v Sypin, 341 Pa Super 506, 491 A2d 1371 (1985); Commonwealth
v Gaskin, 325 Pa Super 349, 472 A2d 1154 (1984); Commonwealth v Knepp, 307 Pa Super
535, 453 A2d 1016 (1982).
91. This view was alluded to by Judge John C. Dowling, Sentencing Discretion In
Pennsylvania: Has The Pendulum Returned To The Trial Judge? 26 Duquesne L Rev 925
(1988).
92. 343 Pa Super 596, 495 A2d 956 (1985).
93. Hutchinson, 495 A2d at 958.
94. See note 67 and accompanying text for a discussion of Sessoms.
95. 513 Pa 508, 522 A2d 17 (1987).
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tencing code by raising, in its argument, a substantial question
that the sentence was inappropriate since it was below the guide-
lines.96  It then vacated the sentence and remanded for
resentencing.11
The supreme court granted review and found that the Common-
wealth had failed to comply with the appellate rules requiring that,
in sentencing appeals where the discretionary aspects of the sen-
tence were challenged, the appellant must set forth, in a separate
section of the brief, "a concise statement of the reasons relied upon
for allowance of appeal."' 9 The court concluded that the argument
section of the Commonwealth's brief could not substitute for the
requirement that the question be separately set forth and con-
cluded that the superior court had erred when it undertook to re-
view the matter." It never discussed, as the superior court had
found, whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentenc-
ing.100 Rather, it held that the intermediate court's finding, after
full review of the record and briefs, that the appellant had
presented a substantial question about the appropriateness of the
sentence would not overcome the procedural default. 01 This effec-
tively overturned prior superior court decisions. 02
96. Commonwealth v Tuladziecki, 346 Pa Super 636, 499 A2d 402 (1985) (unpub-
lished decision).
97. Tuladziecki, 499 A2d at 402.
98. Tuladziecki, 522 A2d at 19. PaRAppP 2119 (f), 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon
1981) reads:
(f) Discretionary Aspects of Sentence.
An appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal
matter shall set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence. The state-
ment shall immediately precede the arguments on the merits with respect to the dis-
cretionary aspects of sentence.
PaRAppR § 2119(0. This language was adopted to implement 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9781
(b) (Purdon 1981).
99. Tuladziecki, 522 A2d at 19.
100. To do so may have involved the court in a jurisdictional issue. See Jones, 613 A2d
at 587 (cited in note 48).
101. The court stated:
Superior Court may not, however, be permitted to rely on its assessment of the argu-
ment on the merits of the issue to justify post hoc a determination that a substantial
question exists. If this determination is not made prior to examination of and ruling
on the merits of the issue of the appropriateness of the sentence, the Commonwealth
has in effect obtained an appeal as of right from the discretionary aspects of a
sentence.
Tuladziecki, 522 A2d at 19.
102. Commonwealth v Easterling, 353 Pa Super 84, 509 A2d 345 (1986). Where a re-
view of the record convinced the court that there was a question about the appropriateness
of the sentence, review would be allowed. See also Commonwealth v Dixon, 344 Pa Super
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This decision added another procedural step to the sentencing
review process.1"3 Struggling to balance the requirements of Tu-
ladziecki with the fact that many pending appeals did not comply
with appellate rule 2119(f) or that appellees were filing motions to
quash those appeals, the superior court confronted Commonwealth
v Krum.10 4 It concluded that the Tuladziecki requirements were
procedural rather than jurisdictional. Thus if the appellee did not
raise appellant's failure to set forth a substantial question, the ob-
jection was waived and the court would proceed to determine if a
substantial question was presented. If a substantial question was
presented then the court would consider the appeal on the
merits.10 5
The effect of Tuladziecki has been the development of
hypertechnical requirements and inconsistent rulings.106 Failure to
include the crime for which the appellant was convicted in the
statement, even if it is listed elsewhere in the brief, made the
statement insufficient. °10 The statement must also include the
crime and length of sentence to warrant review.108 The inconsisten-
cies are evident in the courts rulings, some which have held that a
claim that the sentence exceeded the aggravated range of the
guidelines did not raise a substantial question, 0 9 and others which
have ruled that a claim that the aggravated range was considerably
exceeded, did. 10 A statement that the sentencing judge "unduly
focused" on the crimes has been held to be insufficient,"' as has a
293, 496 A2d 802 (1985); and Commonwealth v Drumgoole, 341 Pa Super 468, 491 A2d 1352
(1985).
103. Commonwealth v Chilcote, 396 Pa Super, 106, 578 A2d 429 (1990). Popovich, J.
in a concurring opinion concluded that this process only imposed an additional tier that
wasted judicial resources. Chilcote, 578 A2d at 441 (concurring opinion).
104. 367 Pa Super 511, 533 A2d 134 (1987).
105. Krum, 533 A2d at 138. In Commonwealth v Gambal, 522 Pa 280, 561 A2d 710
(1989), the supreme court dealt with this issue but raised in a different posture. The supe-
rior court had quashed the appeal for failure to include the required statement. Appellant
petitioned for permission to amend the brief which was denied. The supreme court con-
cluded that the quash was correct, but that the court should have permitted the amendment
to the brief, accepting the Krum court's procedural analysis. See also Commonwealth v
Fusco, 406 Pa Super 351, 594 A2d 373 (1991).
106. There had been a state constitutional challenge to § 9781(b) of the sentencing
code which is the underlying source of this matter. The constitutionality of the section was
upheld in a 5-4 decision, Commonwealth v McFarlin, 402 Pa Super 502, 587 A2d 732 (1991)
aff'd Pa , 607 A2d 730 (1992).
107. Commonwealth v Ziegler, 379 Pa Super 515, 550 A2d 567 (1988).
108. Commonwealth v Cummings, 368 Pa Super 341, 534 A2d 114 (1987).
109. Commonwealth v Ousley, 392 Pa Super 549, 573 A2d 599 (1990).
110. Commonwealth v Burdge, 386 Pa Super 194, 562 A2d 864 (1989).
111. Commonwealth v Minott, 395 Pa Super 552, 577 A2d 928 (1990).
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statement that the trial judge ignored certain sentencing factors.11 2
In the later instance the appellate court ruled that it would con-
clude that the sentencing factors were considered, and deny re-
view." 3 In another case, however, a claim by a defendant, who re-
ceived a standard guideline range sentence, that the sentencing
judge ignored factors which would have justified a mitigated range
sentence, was considered sufficient to warrant review."'
In instances where an appellant can define a specific error by the
sentencing judge, review has been allowed. Also, failing to impose
weapons enhancement will allow review." 5 Certain early cases indi-
cated that claims of improper computation of prior record or of-
fense gravity scores raised a substantial question permitting discre-
tionary review." 6 However, the superior court has recently held
that incorrect computation of these scores is a basis for direct ap-
peal, since their calculation was not discretionary with the trial
judge." 7 A review of any error in these calculations is not at the
appellate court's discretion." 8 The sentencing code requires that a
sentencing judge first determine the applicable guideline ranges
before exercising the discretion inherent in ultimately determining
the sentence.
While Tuladziecki "9 was a procedural ruling, it had a substan-
tial effect in limiting review. Denying review where the claim was
that the weight the trial judge gave to various sentencing factors
was improper, when that denial is based on the rational that those
factors were considered, is disingenuous. It makes meaningful ex-
amination of the court's decisional process non-existent. More fun-
damentally, the inconsistencies occasioned by this decision lead to
unequal application of appellate discretion in granting review. An
examination of Commonwealth sentencing appeals revealed forty-
seven cases where review was allowed on the claim that the trial
court erred by sentencing below the guidelines. However, in two
112. Minott, 577 A2d at 930.
113. Commonwealth v Williams, 386 Pa Super 322, 562 A2d 1385 (1989) (en banc).
114. Commonwealth v Wright, 411 Pa Super 111, 600 A2d 1289 (1991). The panel
ultimately concluded that the trial court did not err in sentencing the appellant, and that,
when faced with mitigating circumstances, a court does not abuse its discretion by not sen-
tencing in the mitigated range. It did not state how the statement of question had differed
from that in Williams. Wright, 600 A2d at 1290.
115. Commonwealth v Dotzman, 403 Pa Super 325, 588 A2d 1312 (1991).
116. Commonwealth v Tilghman, 366 Pa Super 328, 531 A2d 441 (1987).
117. Commonwealth v Johnson, No 3140PHL91 (Pa Super November 16, 1992).
118. Johnson, No 3140PHL91 (Pa Super November 16, 1992).
119. See note 95 and accompanying text.
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cases, 12 0 it was held that the sentence would not be reviewed, even
though the sentence fell below the guideline minimum, because the
appeal was based on the weight that the court gave to the various
factors affecting the sentence.
Recognizing Pennsylvania's commitment to indeterminate sen-
tencing and the trial court's discretionary power to balance various
factors, including rehabilitation, in formulating a sentence, the ap-
pellate courts have given deference to the trial courts' sentencing
scheme. In cases where the appellate court found it necessary to
vacate the sentence on one of multiple convictions, it nevertheless
vacated the entire sentence to allow the trial court on remand to
devise a new sentence which would accomplish the same goals as
the original sentencing scheme. Illustrative was Commonwealth v
Sutton,'21 where defendant appealed an illegal sentence, but did
not appeal his conviction on other charges, and neither did the
Commonwealth. 2 2 The Commonwealth conceded that the sentence
was illegal, but requested that sentence be vacated on the other
charges and the case remanded to allow resentencing on all
charges. The superior court agreed, concluding that to do other-
wise would frustrate the trial court's ability to effectuate its origi-
nal sentencing scheme.1
23
Commonwealth v Devers,24 imposed another limitation on re-
view of a sentencing court's decisional process. Mr. Devers pleaded
guilty to third degree murder and robbery. He received a ten to
twenty year sentence on the murder charge and five to ten years on
the robbery. On appeal, the superior court vacated the sentence
and remanded for resentencing.125 Although the trial judge had a
pre-sentence report and other information about the defendant,
the court concluded that the trial judge had not stated what facts
were considered important and what weight was given to those
facts in arriving at the sentence.1
2 6
Without discussing how it had jurisdiction, 2 1 the supreme court,
120. Commonwealth v Thomas, 366 Pa Super 435, 531 A2d 497 (1987) and Common-
wealth v Scott, 389 Pa Super 653, 560 A2d 830 (1989).
121. 400 Pa Super 291, 583 A2d 500 (1990).
122. Sutton, 583 A2d at 502.
123. Id. See also Commonwealth v Goldhammer, 512 Pa 587, 517 A2d 1280 (1986),
cert denied, 480 US 950 (1987).
124. 519 Pa 88, 546 A2d 12 (1988).
125. 352 Pa Super 611, 505 A2d 1030 (1986). This decision is not reported except in a
table of unpublished decisions.
126. Devers, 546 A2d at 14.
127. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9781 (f) (cited in note 19), prohibits the supreme court
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on a commonwealth appeal, reversed."'8 Following a lengthy dis-
cussion of the development of appellate review of sentencing ac-
tions, the court reaffirmed the commitment to individualized
sentences, and the use of pre-sentence reports to achieve that
goal.12 9 However, the court gave presumptive significance to those
reports by stating:
Where pre-sentence reports exist, we shall continue to presume that the
sentencing judge was aware of relevant information regarding the defend-
ant's character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating stat-
utory factors. A pre-sentence report constitutes the record and speaks for
itself. In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of engaging
in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that sentencers are under
no compulsion to employ checklists or any extended or systematic defini-
tions of their punishment procedure. Having been fully informed by the
pre-sentence report, the sentencing court's discretion should not be dis-
turbed. This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it
can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of awareness of the
sentencing considerations, and there we will presume also that the weighing
process took place in a meaningful fashion.80
Devers has dramatically limited the extent of review that appel-
late courts can undertake in sentencing matters. Where a trial
court has before it a pre-sentence report and the judge indicates
that it was considered in arriving at a sentence, the sentencing pro-
cess has presumptive validity.
Commonwealth v Kerstetter' dealt with a challenge to a pre-
sentence report. At sentencing, the defendant's counsel disputed
the accuracy of statements contained in the report. Without dis-
cussing those challenges, the trial court imposed sentence. On ap-
peal, the superior court concluded that since Devers placed great
reliance on pre-sentence reports, their presumed accuracy disap-
peared when specifically challenged. 1- 2 It then becomes necessary
for the trial court to state for the record what facts it found true,
and on what facts it based the sentence.'
Devers, clearly made the exercise of trial court sentencing discre-
tion virtually unreviewable. The appellate courts are not able to
determine if the trial judge properly considered all relevant sen-
from reviewing discretionary sentencing matters. This was clearly such a case.
128. Devers, 546 A2d at 12.
129. Id at 13.
130. Id at 18.
131. 398 Pa Super 202, 580 A2d 1134 (1990).




tencing factors since judges are presumed to have considered and
properly weighed what was contained in the pre-sentence report.
This is a dramatic retreat from the supreme court's early actions in
Martin and Riggins.134 There can be no effective review of sentenc-
ing actions unless the trial court is required to explain its sentenc-
ing rationale.
THE ARGUMENT FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE DISCRETIONARY
ASPECTS OF SENTENCING
One writer has said that the sentencing decision by a trial judge
"is the most complex and difficult function a jurist is called upon
to perform."135 Pennsylvania's indeterminate sentencing policy and
its non-mandatory guidelines continue to require that judges per-
form this function."3 ' With proper individual background informa-
tion, and, having participated in the trial and learning of the crime
first hand, they are best suited to perform this task.13 7
Pre-sentence reports contain a wealth of information about the
defendant. The guidelines focus the jurist's attention on specific
factors considered important in developing a sentence. This, cou-
pled with the Sentencing Code requirements defining when con-
finement or probation should be considered, helps to structure the
judge's decision making function.
Clearly, in passing the Sentencing Commission legislation, the
legislature contemplated an appellate review process, otherwise it
would not have included section 9781 (b) permitting examination
of discretionary sentencing.
To permit review is not tantamount to concluding that review
will always lead to reversal. It might be argued that the Tu-
ladziecki requirement is a method of obtaining review. In theory, if
a party cannot sufficiently articulate the reasons why a sentence is
inappropriate, then it should be affirmed. In reviewing the state-
ment of reasons it can be said that there has been a form of review.
This argument could have merit if the court was consistent in de-
termining what is a substantial question. Instead, the court has
been consistent only in its inconsistency on that subject. Since it
has been decided that a claim which maintains that the trial court
134. See footnotes 27-33 and accompanying text.
135. Martin, 351 A2d at 659 (Nix, J. dissenting).
136. Cirillo, Windows for Discretion in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, 31
Viii L Rev 1309 (1986).
137. Cirillo, 31 Vill L Rev at 1312 (cited in note 136).
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did not properly consider the factors before it does not raise a
question for review,138 there is effectively no substantive review of
the trial court's discretion in most cases.
We will never be able to reach the question of whether a sen-
tence is manifestly excessive or lenient, as long as we are prevented
by our post-Tuladziecki decisions from evaluating the weight the
trial court gave to the sentencing factors presented to it. Permit-
ting review recognizes that an improper sentence can have dire
consequences on the individual if too severe, and on the public, if
too lenient.
As the guidelines help focus the sentencing judge's attention, so
too should they aid in the review process which the appellate judge
undertakes. Where a sentence departs from the guidelines, the re-
viewing court can easily determine its appropriateness since the
Code requires the trial court to explain its reasons for deviation.
Rather than frustrate review, I suggest that the guidelines aid in
this function. Also, I suggest that appellate review was contem-
plated and expanded, not restricted when the guideline legislation
was passed.
Admittedly, the trial judge's sentencing function is difficult. No
less difficult are decisions involving custody of minor children, yet
these are made everyday and regularly reviewed by appellate
courts. In both cases, the long term effects on people's lives and
their relation to society are involved. Selecting the wrong custodial
parent can adversely affect both the child and society. Here too,
trial judges are given great deference but the decisions do not es-
cape appellate scrutiny. In this jurisdiction, that review is broad
based and trial courts are required to set forth the reasons for the
decision. 3 9 A trial court must file a comprehensive opinion specify-
ing the reasons for its decision.'" Yet, these requirements have not
hampered the court's decision-making responsibilities or resulted
in the appellate court substituting its judgment for the trial court.
So too, can it be in sentencing matters.
To argue that review will overburden the court is no answer to
the question. " Justice. is not achieved by closing the courthouse
door, particularly where a liberty interest is at risk. By setting the
standard of reversal as either an abuse of discretion or an error of
law, few sentences would be reversed, but review would be ob-
138. Commonwealth v Williams, 386 Pa Super 322, 562 A2d 1385, 1386 (1989).
139. Commonwealth ex rel Robinson v Robinson, 505 Pa 226, 478 A2d 800, 806 (1984).
140. Artzt v Artzt, 383 Pa Super 23, 556 A2d 409, 410 (1989).
141. Commonwealth v McFarlin, 402 Pa Super 509, 587 A2d 732.
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tained. Most of these claims could easily be considered while re-
viewing the record on the other issues presented.
Appellate review of sentencing decisions will not overwhelm the
appellate courts. An examination of appeals from judgments of
sentence between January 1, 1985 and August 13, 1991 revealed
9335 appeals by defendants, and 151 by the Commonwealth. 1 2
Since defendants' appeals include all claims of error, review for
sentencing error would be part of the overall review process. Fur-
ther, since the largest percentage of sentences are in the standard
guideline range and the most frequent reason given for departure
is plea-agreements, one can anticipate that these cases will not pre-
sent a basis for review.
To accomplish meaningful review, both the Commonwealth and
the defendant should be granted a right to appeal from discretion-
ary sentencing decisions. This would require amendment of section
9781, and would eliminate the appellate procedural morass created
by Tuladziecki.
Trial courts would still be required to comply with sentencing
procedures. Review of a pre-sentence report, presence of the de-
fendant with a right to be heard, familiarity with the applicable
guideline ranges, absence of a predetermined local sentencing pol-
icy, and a statement of reasons for the sentence must be evident in
the record.14 s
In addition to examining the procedural process used in impos-
ing the sentence, review must also be substantive. Trial judges in
Pennsylvania are now required by rule to set forth their reasons in
support of their decisions when an appeal has been taken. There-
fore, to state reasons in support of the chosen sentence presents no
additional burden.14 4 Further, the sentencing code requires a court
to set forth its reasons for a particular sentence. 45 There can be no
purpose for this requirement if the appropriateness of the decision
cannot be examined.
In order to accomplish meaningful substantive review of the rea-
142. Under Pennsylvania practice, a Commonwealth appeal from a judgment of sen-
tence will only contain a sentencing question, while a defendant's appeal is not limited to
sentencing issues but will include all claims of trial court error.
143. PaRCrP 1405, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1981) details many of the proce-
dural requirements of a sentencing hearing.
144. PaRAppP 1925, 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1981).
145. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9721 (b) requires "... . In every case in which the court
imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, the court shall make as a part of the rec-
ord, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or rea-
sons for the sentence imposed." Id.
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sons for a particular sentence, two steps must be taken. First, the
Devers presumption that the trial court properly considered the
pre-sentence report must be eliminated. Second, until now pre-
sentence reports did not always accompany the record to the ap-
pellate court. A January 17, 1992 amendment to the rules now per-
mits the sealing of these reports and their inclusion in the record
for review. This process must be enforced." 6
Although review should be substantive in guideline cases, it
should be limited to examining the selection of the proper guide-
line range, and departures above or below the guidelines. Once it is
determined that the trial court selected the correct range, the se-
lection of punishment within that range should not be questioned.
The selection of the correct sentencing range is the major sentenc-
ing decision. Therefore the trial court's reasons for selecting a
given range presents the most appropriate question for review. To
permit examination of sentences within a given range is tinkering
with the sentence; merely substituting the appellate court's discre-
tion for the trial courts. Accepting that sentencing decisions are
difficult and that trial judges must be given great latitude, it is
suggested that review of the articulated reasons for selecting a par-
ticular sentencing range would not diminish their role. If the sen-
tence imposed cannot be supported by reasons, one must wonder if
it is just.
This same standard should apply to departures from the guide-
lines. If departure is justified, the extent of that departure would
not be subject to challenge, as long as it is within the legal limit.
It is in examining reasons for selections among the guideline
ranges or departures, above or below the guidelines, that a body of
case law would develop; a "common law" of sentencing. Appellate
review will have the ability to enhance standardization of sentenc-
ing, but permit the trial judge to deviate when supported by the
record. There will not be a loss of individualized sentencing. " 7
In matters where the appellate court determines an inappropri-
ate guideline range or an unjustified departure from the guidelines
has occurred, the appellate court should set forth in its decision
the correct range. This specific instruction to the trial court would
reduce the possibility that the same sentence would be imposed
following remand. It would eliminate wastefulness in the review
146. PaRCrP 1404, 42 Pa Cons StatAnn (Purdon 1981), as amended January 17, 1992,
deals with disclosure of reports.
147. Charles B. Burr,II, Appellate Review as a Means of Controlling Criminal Sen-
tencing Discretion- Workable Alternative? 33 Pitt L Rev 1 (1971).
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process and insure that the trial court formulates a correct sen-
tence on remand.
Also, since concurrent sentences are presumed unless the trial
court orders consecutive sentences,148 there should be review of
trial court decisions to impose consecutive sentences. 4 9 Here
again, the trial court must state its reasons for such a sentence.
However, in those cases where the individual sentences are appro-
priate but their cumulative effect is excessive, the appellate court
should impose the correct sentence. This would eliminate the pos-
sibility that the trial court would reach the same result in a differ-
ent way, and would shift the sentencing function to the appellate
court by making it responsible for the sentence. This responsibility
should deter appellate courts from overreaching, yet allow for cor-
rection of excessive sentences.
CONCLUSIONS
The 1974 Sentencing Code attempted to structure sentencing
decisions. Adding. to this process were the decisions in Martin and
Riggins,150 followed by the creation of the Sentencing Commission
for the purpose of establishing guidelines for sentencing. Accompa-
nying the creation of the commission was the legislative expression
establishing appellate review of sentencing decisions. Unfortu-
nately, Pennsylvania's appellate courts have frustrated this review
and the legislative intent of a structured and reviewable sentencing
process.
To return to a meaningfully structured decisional process, appel-
late review of sentencing decisions must exist. Review must look to
more than the application of correct procedures. It must examine
the underlying reasons for particular sentencing decisions. This
can be done without limiting trial court discretion. It is to accom-
plish this goal that this paper is offered, to suggest ways to achieve
correct sentences in an individualized sentencing jurisdiction with
nonmandatory guidelines.
148. PaRCrP 1406(a), 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann (Purdon 1981) provides for concurrent
sentences when a defendant is being sentenced on more than one conviction, or where a
defendant is incarcerated on other charges unless the judges states otherwise.
149. Recently, the superior court has become active in reviewing consecutive
sentences. Commonwealth v Simpson, 353 Pa Super 474, 510 A2d 760 (1986) involved a
remand because of excessive consecutive sentences. At resentencing, the trial court imposed
consecutive sentences totaling 25 years instead of the original 30 years minimum. On appeal
the court affirmed. Commonwealth v Simpson, 384 Pa Super 18, 557 A2d 751 (1989); see
also Commonwealth v Rizzi, 402 Pa Super 335, 586 A2d 1380 (1991).
150. See notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
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